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A generalized conception of an insurgency situation is examined with
a systems approach. The model is divided into two sectors, propaganda
and military. The emphasis in the propaganda sector is on all actions
taken by the insurgent and government sides which have a psychological
impact on the population. In the military sector variables associated with
combat and troop replacement are examined. A computer simulation,
written in DYNAMO II, is provided and several simulation runs are
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I. SUMMARY
Past studies which have concentrated on the individual aspects and
variables related to an insurgency situation in isolation from one another
ignore an important fact about insurgencies which is true of all social and
political systems. That fact is that the variables in these systems, in-
cluding insurgencies, interact on a continuous basis, and the interactions
are indispensable to the complete description of an insurgency. The alter-
native to isolating variables and ignoring important interactions is to model
insurgency as a system, with the ultimate goals of including the signifi-
cant variables of the system and the description of their interaction with
each other. This paper has attempted to lay the groundwork for such a
model.
The medium used in the construction of this beginning insurgency
model was a method of modelling called system dynamics. System dynamics
was devised by Professor Jay W. Forrester of M. I. T. , as a means of
modelling complex social and industrial systems. In an attempt to demon-
strate the behavior of the system, as depicted in the insurgency growth
model, on a nearly continuous basis, a computer simulation was written
for this study. The simulation was written for the DYNAMO compiler,
which was written to provide a computer language for time-stepped simu-
lations involving many interacting variables.
The basic insurgency growth model is divided into two sectors: propa-
ganda and military. The population equations (that is, the breakdown of

the total population into insurgent, government, and neutral populations)
collectively provide a focal point for all system behavior generated in the
propaganda and military sectors. That is, all system behavior ultimately
results in some change in the population profile. The segmentation of the
population is also the principal indicator of the state of the insurgency
system.
The propaganda sector of the model is the more highly aggregated of
the two. In this sector, all action of a psychological nature which either
the insurgent side or the government side can take is combined in one
variable called propaganda effort. Implicit in this variable are programs
such as education, civic action, propaganda, and economic controls. The
driving force which determines the intensity of the propaganda effort is
represented to be each side's perception of the ratio of government citi-
zens to the total population. Probability coefficients are derived in this
sector which describe the probability that a citizen aligned with a particu-
lar population faction will change his allegiance to some other faction.
The military sector contains combat and troop-level sub-models. The
combat sub- model employs Lanchester's equations of combat, written as
difference equations, for determining the battle attrition rates for both
sides. An insurgent troop level of 1000 men is used as the point of change-
over from guerrilla- style warfare to more conventional warfare. During
the guerrilla warfare stage, a Lanchester approach for aimed fire is used
for the government attrition rate and a Lanchester approach for area fire is

used for the insurgent attrition rate. In the conventional warfare stage,
the equations reflect aimed fire for both sides.
The size of the troop force for the insurgents is maintained at a level
proportional to the total insurgent population. The proportion is variable
and its magnitude is determined in a functional relationship with the in-
surgent share of the population as the independent variable. Insurgent
troop shortages are replaced on an instantaneous basis. Government
troop levels are represented as dependent on the size of the insurgent
combat force. The government troop additions and replacements are
modeled as subject to various training and bureaucratic delays.
The DYNAMO simulation of the insurgency system provides the analyst
with many useful indicators of the progress of the insurgency. Many
variables can be observed over time which may give a deeper insight into
the operation of the insurgency system. Some of the variables suggested
for inclusion in the simulation output for each time period are the populations,
the percent change in government and insurgent populations, and a running
total of government and insurgent troops killed. Other variables which
might give some understanding of the procedure established for maintenance
of government troop levels are the actual insurgent troop strength, the
indicated government troop strength, and the actual government troop
strength. The indicated government troop strength is arrived at through a
functional relationship with the actual insurgent troop strength. The actual
government troop strength, when it is compared with the indicated strength

for a particular time period, reveals the effects of the time delays placed
in the system for troop level maintenance.
Computer simulation results were obtained for a variety of initial
population allocations. Two initial allocations for the insurgent side
were investigated, 1 percent and 5 percent. Government allocations of 20
through 60 percent were used with each of the insurgent allocations.
Generally, the system behavior observed was the same for all initial popu-
lation profiles. There was an initial period of growth in both the insurgent
and government populations , attributable to propaganda effects on the
neutral population. The troop levels and combat activity were low during
this growth period. Maximum population for insurgents and government
are reached at about 31 and 55 percent of the total, respectively. Combat
activity becomes predominant at this point and a general decline in the
government faction is observed. When the government population declines
to about 41 percent of the total population and the insurgent population
reaches its maximum of 31 percent, the system settles down to one of
relatively little activity. That is, the rate of change in the insurgent and
government populations is very slow. This type of activity continues until
the end of the simulation run. The only difference noted in the behavior
of the system for differing initial population profiles was the speed with
which the system attained the various stages of activity just described.
The rapidity with which the three stages of activity (growth, decline,
abatement) were observed grew with the initial size of the government





The purpose of the work reported in this paper was to study a general-
ized conception of an insurgency situation from a highly aggregated point
of view. Many studies have been conducted and models constructed to
investigate specific areas of insurgencies, but apparently no effort has
been made to quantitatively study the complete insurgency system. The
fundamental premise of this study is that an insurgency can be represented
as a bounded system within which all behavior peculiar to an insurgency
is generated. It remains, then, to determine what variables are included
in this system, how they behave, and how they interact with one another.
The model constructed for this study supposes that an insurgency can
be segmented into two sectors: one called psychological and one called
military. This formulation recognizes that an insurgency is, in essence,
a contest between two forces for control of the population of a country or
an area of a country. In this contest, the insurgent force and the force in
power (the government force) have two avenues of action open to them.
The first of these two courses of action is an attempt to win the popu-
lation through psychological appeals. This form of action encompasses a
wide range of possibilities for the accomplishment of goals. Some of the
methods by which either side might seek to accomplish its objectives in
the psychological area are: education, community services, civic action,
propaganda, and economic controls. In the insurgency growth model, all
of these factors are combined into one variable called propaganda.
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The second type of action the government or insurgent force can take
in order to gain power over the population is military. While psychological
action is pursued primarily for the purpose of winning over that portion of
the population which is uncommitted, that is the neutral population,
military action is exercised by the two opposing forces against one another
directly. The goal of either force when taking military action is to gain or
preserve power by eliminating the opposing force. The military sector of
an insurgency, therefore, is presumed to be concerned with combat.
This systems appraoch to insurgency is worthwhile, because once a
reasonable representation of the insurgency as a whole is achieved, one
is able to view all the implications of a proposed plan or action simul-
taneously. Isolated studies such as a cost-effectiveness study of a civic
action program or the evaluation of intelligence collection efforts are
worthwhile but their value increases greatly when one can view them in
the context of the entire system. Further, the systems approach allows
the analyst to conduct sensitivity analysis for the purpose of determining
those factors in the system which are most critical and therefore deserve
the most attention in research.
In this study, a model was constructed using the simplifications and
structure already outlined. A computer simulation was used to analyze
numerical results from the model. The computer simulation allows the
variables of the model to interact on a nearly continuous basis.
The model is described in Chapter III, and the simulation is presented
in Chapter IV. Chapter V is devoted to a description of the assumptions
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used in the model and an analysis of the rationale for those assumptions.
In Chapter VI, several indicators are suggested as useful in describing
the state of the insurgency as it is portrayed in this model. Also, Chapter
VI will analyze simulation runs to give further insight into the workings of
the model. Chapter VII contains conclusions and several suggestions for




An insurgency situation is described by a myriad of variables, as is
any complex political or social system. One of the aims of this paper is
to reduce the insurgency situation to a manageable number of variables.
Another goal of this project is to describe the interactions among the
various elements of insurgencies. This second goal is approached through
the use of the "system dynamics" method of modelling complex social and
industrial systems, attributable to Professor Jay W. Forrester of M. I. T. [4]
An overview of the system dynamics method is presented here. The




Level and Rate Substructure.
The closed boundary concept defines a boundary which contains the system
of interest and states that the behavior characteristic of that system is
created entirely within the boundary. Outside occurences may affect the
system but must be viewed as disturbances for the excitation of the system.
The feedback loop structure is really the essential element of the system.
This loop is a path in the model linking decision, action, level (or state)
of the system, and information about the system. The level and rate vari-
ables provide the foundation for the feedback loop. The level variables
14

describe the condition of the system at any time, and the rate variables
determine the rate of change of the level variables. This heirarchy pro-
vides the means by which one may show, through the actions (or rate
variables) , all the interrelationships of the elements of his model.
In this insurgency model the closed boundary describes a hypothetical
population split between pro -government, neutral, and insurgent factions.
Unlike the Forrester structure, the model is divided into two sectors:
propaganda (or psychological) and military. The levels and rates within
each of these sectors and their relationship to each other describe the
insurgency system. Both of these sectors determine the rates for the
generation and attrition processes for each of the three factions of the
population as well as total population.
A computer simulation was written for the model in DYNAMO II. The
simulation will be discussed in detail in Chapters IV and V, but it is
necessary at this point to understand the time orientation of the simula-
tion in order to follow the rationale behind the equations of the model.
DYNAMO II is designed for time-stepped simulations. Once the user,
determines the smallest time frame of interest, he must tailor all the
equations of his model to that time frame. The basic time unit selected
for the insurgency growth model was one month, so, the output of the
simulation in one itteration may be viewed as the result of one month's
activity in the insurgency system. For example, the insurgent troop at-
trition rate for one time period in the simulation is the result of one month




The two most important levels contained in the propaganda sector are
those called insurgent propaganda effort and government propaganda effort.
These levels are an aggregation of all possible actions the government and
insurgent sides can take other than those of a purely military nature. In-
cluded in the range of these variables are actions such as education, com-
munity services, civic action programs, propaganda, and economic controls.
The intensity of the propaganda effort for both the insurgent and
government sides is determined by an equation of the form:
EFFORT = a • (Desired effort this time period)
+ (1 - a) ' (Actual effort last time period), where £ d ^ 1.
This equation allows the propaganda decision-maker to base his present
allocation of effort not only on the present indicators but on past trends as
well. Desired propaganda effort is determined from a functional relation-
ship for each side. The independent variable for this relationship is each
side's perception of the ratio of government citizens to the total population.
This perceived ratio is determined through the use of an intelligence co-
efficient for each side. The propaganda effort is scaled from zero to ten
for simplicity. This variable can be interpreted in terms of money, man-
power, or a quantity which embodies both. It is recognized that the zero
to ten scale is meaningless by itself, but is useful in a relative sense




The probability coefficients correspond to actual probabilities of cer-
tain events taking place in a time period. They are used in the population
rate equations to determine population attrition and generation. There are
six probabilities from propaganda (corresponding to six possible events):
1. The probability a neutral citizen changes allegiance to insurgent.
2. The probability a government citizen changes allegiance to insurgent
3. The probability a government citizen changes allegiance to neutral.
4. The probability an insurgent changes allegiance to neutral.
5. The probability an insurgent changes allegiance to government.
6. The probability a neutral citizen changes allegiance to government.
The probabilities are computed from equations of the form:
P(x to y) = P (insurgents or govt, reaches a citizen)
•P(citizen reached is x)
• P(ins. or govt, propaganda makes x change to y)
.
The probability that insurgent-government propaganda "reaches" a citizen
is found in a functional relationship for which the independent variable is
insurgent (or government) propaganda intensity. The probability that a
citizen will be x is simply the ratio of x citizens to the total population.
The probability that the insurgent-government propaganda is favorable
enough on x citizens to make them change their allegiance to the y popu-
lation is computed in one of six relationships (corresponding to the six
possible events previously listed) where the independent variable is
insurgent-government propaganda intensity. Once these probabilities are
obtained, they are used in the appropriate population rate equation. For
17

instance, the probability that an insurgent converts to the government
side (PMIG) would be used in the government population generation rate




+ PMIG • (Present No. of insurgents) + . . .
B. THE MILITARY SECTOR
The military sector of this model is concerned with two related
problems: combat and troop replacement. The important levels of this
sector are the troop levels: insurgent, government police, and govern-
ment regulars. They, almost as much as the population profiles, serve
to describe the progress of the insurgency. The number of insurgent
troops, for instance, includes not just combat troops but the number of
full-time, hard-core insurgents present in the system. This number con-
trasted with the total insurgent population (which might include everyone
from sympathizer to full-time soldier) could give one some insight relative
to the "seriousness" of the insurgency. Additionally, if the number of
troops on both sides increases, the combat model takes on more of the
characteristics of conventional warfare, which certainly has major impli-
cations for the conduct of counter-insurgency operations.
C. THE COMBAT MODEL
The means of determining the number of government and insurgent
troops killed in a time period is through an insurgent warfare modification
of Fredrick W. Lanchester's equations of combat.

Battlefield attrition equations should provide for two distinct types of
combat. First, in the initial stages of insurgency, when insurgent strength
is low, the insurgent group is quite likely to devote relatively few of its
number to combat duties. At this point, the insurgents are more interested
in propaganda and broadening their base of support. Consequently, when
their force is small, the insurgents will probably be unwilling to engage
the government forces in combat. Also, when combat does occur, the in-
surgents should have the advantage of fighting on their own terrain, and
many times, on their own terms. Equations for this type of combat should
reflect government difficulty in bringing the insurgents to battle as well as
the likely government disadvantage when combat does occur.
The second type of combat situation becomes apparent when the in-
surgent force grows larger. The insurgents now begin to shift their empha-
sis to military operations in an attempt to defeat the government decisively.
As this phase in the insurgency develops, combat begins to resemble con-
ventional warfare with increasing frequency of contact, larger forces in-
volved in combat during any given contact, and more of an advantage to
the force which has better equipment (presumably the government with air-
craft, tanks, etc.) •
With this second variety of combat in mind, then, we wish to write
the equations in such a way that they reflect the shift in emphasis by the
insurgent group and the ensuing changes in the combat situation. S.J.
Deitchman [3] adapted Lanchester's equations for use in the analysis of
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guerrilla warfare. His resulting equations for government and insurgent
attrition rates are:
dGovt./dt = - ol • (no. insurgent troops)
dlns./dt = - $ • (no govt, troops) • (no. ins. troops).
The equation for the government attrition rate employs the Lanchester form
for aimed fire. The equation for insurgent attrition rate, on the other hand,
utilizes the Lanchester form for area fire. Although different dimensionally
,
the constants a and P can be viewed as "weapons effectiveness coefficients. "
Deitchman gives the advantage of ambush to the insurgent group in
these equations. This may not be true for all insurgency situations.
More important than the conceptual basis for the equations, however, is
the behavior of the equations. By using Deitchman 1 s equations and judi-
ciously choosing 8 (government weapons effectiveness) one can represent
the difficulty government forces have historically experienced in achieving
significant military results against small insurgent forces. That is, in the
equation for insurgent attrition rate, one can see that as the insurgent
force grows smaller, fewer insurgents are killed per unit time. If one
views this arrangement as a reflection of the unwillingness of small in-
surgent groups to engage in combat, rather than in the insurgent ambush vs.
conventional warfare context, a reasonable representation of combat in the
beginning stages of an insurgency is achieved.
As the insurgent group grows, of course, the size of its military force
increases as does the desire for combat. It would follow also, that with
20

these larger forces and the increased frequency of contact, combat begins
to take on more of the characteristics of conventional warfare. This phen-
omenon requires that the model first have a criterion for determining when
this shift in combat emphasis occurs, and second that the model must be
able to reflect that shift in its equations for attrition.
In this insurgency model the first requirement, a criterion for determin-
ing when combat begins to shift toward conventional warfare, is satisfied
by setting a level of insurgent troop strength (1000 in this case) as the
beginning of the shift in combat emphasis. As this point, a number of
changes take place in the input to the attrition equations. These changes
can be described by contrasting the values the attrition equation variables
take on during the time that the insurgent force is considered "small" and
after the insurgent force has gained sufficient strength to begin conducting
more conventional combat operations.
The government and insurgent attrition rate equations appear in the
model as difference equations,
DG = FCI • TTI
DI = FCG • TTG ' IC
,
where DG and DI represent government and insurgent troops killed per time
period. The variables FCI and FCG are, respectively, the "fighting con-
stants" for insurgent and government troops and serve the same role as
Lanchester attrition coefficients. The total number of insurgent troops
involved in combat during the present time period is represented by TTI,
21

and TTG is the corresponding variable for government troops. The variable
IC is equal to TTI when the insurgent force strength is below that required
by the model for the shift to more conventional warfare. After the insurgent
force reaches the required strength IC becomes a constant equal to 1000.
Prior to the shift to conventional combat, the equations for DG and DI
are just as previously described. That is, the equation for government
attrition employs Lanchester's form reflecting aimed fire for the insurgents,
and the insurgent attrition rate uses Lanchester's form for area fire. To
achieve a reasonable representation of the early stages of combat, the
fighting constants are fixed at . 1 for the insurgent force and 0.0001 for
the government force. When combat shifts toward conventional warfare
FCI increases linearly to a maximum of 0.2. At the same time, FCG in-
creases linearly to 0.0002, but FCG reaches its maximum more rapidly
than FCI. Since once the shift occurs IC assumes a constant value of
1000, the effect is to attrit both the government and insurgent forces using
Lanchester's form for aimed fire, with the government fighting constant
assuming the same order of magnitude as the insurgent fighting constant.
The difference between the rates of increase for the government and in-
surgent fighting constants gives an initial "equipment" advantage to the
government forces when they begin to fight something resembling a con-
ventional war.
The variables for total troops involved in combat are also computed
in two ways, depending on the phase of combat. When combat is in the
initial phase, the total troops involved for both sides is simply set at the
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total number of soldiers each side has (or any multiple) . After the shift
toward conventional warfare occurs, a table is entered each time period
to find the expected number of encounters between government and in-
surgent forces. The independent variable for this table is the total number
of insurgent troops. Another table is entered at the same time to find the
expected force size for both sides. The quantities obtained by multiplying
expected force size by the expected number of encounters are the total
troops involved per time period for both sides.
The combat submodel, in summary, passes through two stages. The
first stage can be described as guerrilla warfare. In this phase, the govern-
ment forces have a difficult time locating and bringing the small insurgent
force to combat. Consequently, the insurgent force undergoes a very small
attrition rate during this phase. As the number of insurgents grows, the
model begins to shift toward more conventional warfare. The attrition rate
is computed under the same rules for both sides and the advantage for the
government of better equipment becomes apparent. Combat attrition for
both sides is established always by the same two equations. Government
forces, both policy and regulars, are to be attrited separately. This is
accomplished by simply multiplying the government attrition rate in a time
period by the fraction of police and regulars present in the system in that
time period.
D. TROOP GENERATION AND REPLACEMENT MODEL
The model uses the beginning levels of total population and insurgent
population to generate initial forces for both the insurgents and the
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government. The decision rule for the insurgents is represented by finding
a percentage of their total strength which they desire to devote to combat.
This percentage depends on the current ratio of insurgents to the total
population. Generally, the fraction of insurgent strength allocated to
troops will be small when this ratio is small and relatively large as the
ratio becomes large.
The initial assignment of government forces is found in a functional
relationship which depends on the government intelligence estimate of
insurgent troop strength. As a rule, this relationship will attempt to main-
tain relatively high ratios of government troops to insurgent troops when
insurgent strength is low and, as insurgent strength grows, this ratio will
apprach one. Additionally, as input to the model, the user must specify
what portion to the total government strength is to be devoted to police.
This is done by specifying the desired ratio of police to the total popula-
tion. The model then determines how many police are needed, and the
government regulars make up the difference.
As the insurgency progresses, the means used to determine the initial
government and insurgent troop requirements becomes a procedure for set-
ting "goals" for each successive time period. That is, for each time
period, insurgent troop strength is estimated by the government, and the
insurgents' share of the population is determined by the insurgent group.
The quantities obtained from the relationships for insurgents and the
government become the desired troop levels for the next time period.
24

In the case of the insurgents, the portion of the total strength to be
devoted to troops is obtained and the required number is added to the
force in the next time period. If the actual number of troops is greater
than that required, those "extras" are disposed of by attrition. This process
is, in essence, recruitment directly from the insurgent population. Thus,
the allowable size of the insurgent force is directly dependent on two things:
insurgent share of the total population and total insurgent strength. How-
ever, both of these quantities depend on the effectiveness of the insur-
gents' propaganda campaign, or the number of people they are able to
recruit
.
The government group has two categories in which to maintain troop
levels: police and regulars. The category of "police" as it is used here
may be interpreted to include both police forces and local militia. This
force is obtained entirely from the population. Replacement is called for
when the number of police falls below the prescribed ratio with the popu-
lation, and any excess is allowed to diminish through combat attrition.
There is also a "training" delay for police replacement.
The government is allowed to generate additional troops and replace
regular troops lost through combat attrition from outside the system. In
this model, the government does no recruiting directly from the local popu-
lation. Since the government desires to use its resources most efficiently,
however, it is faced with the additional problem of removing soldiers from
the system when the number of regulars present exceeds the number required
25

So, in each time period, the government determines the difference between
existing regulars and that number required by the present level of insurgent
strength. If the difference shows that more regulars are required, that
number is added after a delay attributable to training and a decision-
making process. This delay not only holds up the entire requested reinforce-
ment but allows the troops to arrive in the system only a few at a time.
This procedure provides an element of realism in that the government is in
a constant "hunting" process in an attempt to satisfy a troop level goal
about which it never has completely accurate information.
For the task of removing troops which are in excess of those desired,
the government group has a similar problem. The difference here is that
a lower limit is set on the number of government regulars to be scheduled
for removal in any time period. This provides for government recognition
that their allocation system is not precise and that an error in the direction
of too many troops is better than leaving too few in the system. Once the
decision has been made to remove regular troops from the system, a delay
of the type characteristic of troop replacement is experienced.
The military sector of the model that we have described contains a
process of attrition and replacement of not only the insurgent and govern-
ment forces but, through the insurgent and police forces, attrition of the
total population as well. The combat attrition sub-model uses Lanchester's
equations of combat in two modes: traditional guerrilla warfare and con-
ventional warfare. Troop replacement for the insurgent group is described
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as a relatively simple process of recruitment from the existing insurgent
population, with their requirements being determined by their success in
converting the population through propaganda. Government troop replace-
ment, on the other hand, is structured as a rather complex process with
bureaucratic and training delays as well as decision-making based on in-
complete or incorrect information.
The output from the propaganda and military sectors comes together to
provide the basis for the population rate equations. These rate equations,
in turn, determine the population levels; total, neutral, insurgent, and
government; for each time period. Table I shows the contributors to each

















1 . propaganda conversion neutral
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ganda conversion neutral2. propa
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Insurgent Population Generation Attrition
1. propaganda conversion neutral 1. propaganda conversion insurgent
to insurgent to neutral
2. propaganda conversion govern- 2. propaganda conversion insurgent
ment to insurgent to government
3. insurgent combat attrition rate
Government Population Generation Attrition
1. propaganda conversion neutral 1. propaganda conversion government
neutral to government to neutral
2. propaganda conversion 2. propaganda conversion government
insurgent to government to insurgent
3. police combat attrition rate.
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IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPUTER SIMULATION
A computer simulation was written for this study in DYNAMO II for the
IBM 360-67 computer. The DYNAMO II compiler was designed by the In-
dustrial Dynamics Group at the Sloan School of Management, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, to provide a computer language to complement
the system dynamics method of modeling. A complete description of
DYNAMO II is found in the DYNAMO II User's Manual [5]. The simulation,
therefore, is structured in much the same manner as the model which was
described in Chapter III.
The simulation advances in one-month time steps for as many months
as the analyst desires. Through a system of time subscripting unique to
DYNAMO II, the levels, which describe the state of the insurgency, are
computed at the beginning of each one month time period, using rates com-
puted with inputs from the previous time period. For example, the present
insurgent generation rate to and subtracting the insurgent attrition rate from
insurgent population level in the previous time period. The insurgent
generation and attrition rates would have been computed during the previous
time period.
There are four types of equations used in the simulation: level, rate,
auxiliary, and initial value. A level equation was just described in an
example of the DYNAMO time procedures as they apply to this simulation.
The important level equations in the simulation are total population,
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insurgent population, government population, neutral population, govern-
ment troop level (regulars)
,
government troop level (police) , and insurgent
troop level
.
There are two rate equations associated with each of the important
level equations mentioned above. One rate equation depicts growth in a
particular level and the other depicts attrition or reduction in size. Just
as in the level equations, new rates computed in each time period are
retained by the DYNAMO compiler for use in computing present level values.
Auxiliary equations are used principally to provide input for the rate
equations. They are always computed for the present time period, using
input from the present time period. An example of an auxiliary equation
is provided by the computation of the probability of an insurgent's con-
version to neutral status by propaganda. This probability is the product
of the present values for the probability that the government reaches a
citizen with propaganda, the probability that the citizen is an insurgent,
and the probability of converting an insurgent to neutral with propaganda.
The resulting value is then used as a propaganda coefficient in the insur-
gent attrition rate and neutral citizen generation rate equations.
Included in the topic of auxiliary equations are three special DYNAMO
function types used in the simulation. These functions are the tabular
function, noise function, and delay function. The table function is a
table look-up routine for which the argument is present value of some
system variable (i.e. levels or auxiliaries) . It is in these tables that
most of the critical assumptions of the model, and therefore the simulation,
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are contained. Since the individual tables will be discussed in detail in
Chapter V, it is important to note only a few characteristics of the tabular
function here. The independent variable for the table and its range of
values are set forth in an auxiliary equation. A "table" expression follows
this auxiliary equation. This expression provides values of the dependent
variable at specified intervals. The program uses linear interpolation to
arrive at values between the provided coordinates.
The noise function is used for the generation of random numbers,
which are uniformly distributed between -1/2 and +1/2. This function can
be modified by a linear transformation to broaden or narrow the range of
numbers generated and is most useful when used as a coefficient to reflect
the effectiveness of military intelligence. For example, an intelligence
coefficient of this type is used to compute both the insurgent and govern-
ment evaluation of enemy strength.
The third special DYNAMO function used in the simulation is the delay
function. There are two types of delay functions used in DYNAMO. The
first simply holds up the delivery of information to the decision-making
process or material to the system by a user-specified number of time periods
An example of this type of delay is provided by the delay brought on by the
need to train troops before using them as replacements. After the specified
delay all the material or information is allowed to reach its destination at
once.
The second type of delay used also stops delivery of information or
material for a specified number of time periods. In addition, this delay,
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after the waiting period has passed, allows only a portion of the informa-
tion or material to arrive during succeeding time periods. That is, after
waiting the required time, the information or material is allowed to only
trickle into the system.
The initial value equations occur in three forms. Some initial values
are provided as numerical input by the user. Equations are also written
for initial values of certain variables, using constants and the initial values
of other variables as input. Many initial values in the simulation are com-
puted automatically by the DYNAMO compiler.
For this study the program written is composed of the four major
equation types and the functions discussed above and is constructed around
three major parts: population, propaganda, and military. The population
segment of the program is composed of level equations which describe the
division of the population among the government, insurgent, and neutral
factions as well as the size of the total population in any time period.
The rate equations associated with each of the population levels are in-
cluded in this segment also.
In the propaganda sector the levels of interest are those which describe
the current propaganda effort for both the government and insurgent groups
.
These levels are used in the functional relationships of the propaganda
sector to provide input to the relationships which compute the propaganda
probability coefficients (i.e. the probability that a citizen switches his
allegiance from one population faction to another). These coefficients are,
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in turn, used in the population rate equations. The propaganda effort
levels are computed from auxiliary equations.
The military sector contains the equations for combat as well as those
for troop replacement. Government troops (regular)
,
government troops
(police) , and insurgent troops are the important levels in this sector.
There are also levels for total insurgent troops killed and total government
troops killed, but these are only for scorekeeping purposes.
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V. ASSUMPTIONS AND RATIONALE
The insurgency growth model was discussed in general terms in Chap-
ter III. Chapter IV provided an explanation of the DYNAMO equations and
functions used in the simulation written for this study. The basic structure
of the simulation was also discussed in Chapter IV. This chapter provides
a detailed description of the assumptions employed in the simulation.
The organization of this chapter will be based on the framework of the
computer program. That is, there will be three major areas for discussion:
Population equations, propaganda sector, and military sector. Much of the
material that follows will be couched in terms of the DYNAMO equations
and functions used in the simulation. Therefore, some review of the
material in the previous two chapters will be implicit in the presentation
of this chapter.
The first section of the simulation concerns population and contains
the most important levels in the model. The profile resulting from the
breakdown of the population among the three factions; government, neutral,
and insurgent; yields a revealing statement about the state of the insurgency
at any time. Also, the values that the three levels for population take on
largely determine the behavior of the system. The initial values which
must be supplied to this section are total population, insurgent population,
and government population. These values are entirely arbitrary. The at-
trition and generation rate equations associated with each population level
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depend on the coefficients for propaganda effectiveness which are generated
in the propaganda sector and the population attrition terms found in the
military sector.
In Chapter III, it can be seen that the propaganda effort for both the
insurgent and government sides was scaled from zero to ten. It is clear
that for interpretation, the propaganda effort should probably be expressed
in terms such as manpower or money. However, the relationships of the
model are stated, in a relative sense, so that the zero to ten scaling is
useful.
The propaganda effort decision rule for both sides makes use of the
exponential smoothing technique. If we let E. be the actual propaganda
effort i months ago and let I. be the indicated effort ("indicated" in the
sense of a current system goal) i months ago, then the decision equation
for either side takes the form,
NEW EFFORT = a I + (1 -a) E ,
where <a^l. By substitution this equation becomes
NEW EFFORT = al + a(l -a)I + a (1 - a) 2 I + • • •
.
Thus, it is apparent that our assumption is that the insurgent and govern-
ment decision-makers rely on both the present indicated effort and the
past trend to determine the actual effort to be devoted to propaganda in the
present time period. The coefficient for either side must be chosen by the
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user to be representative of the system under study. Clearly, the larger
Of becomes, the more responsive the system becomes to the indicated effort,
and consequently, to random fluctuations in the system. As a general
rule a = 0.1 provides a satisfactory compromise between a system that is
too stable and thus fails to follow changes in the real system and a system
that fluctuates wildly with immediate indicators [2].
The term indicated effort was mentioned above in the context of a
demand made or a goal set by the system in the present time period. This
is really what indicated effort is, and is established for each side by a
functional relationship (Figures 1 and 2) . The independent variables for
the insurgent and government indicated effort functions are the insurgent
and government perceptions, respectively, of the ratio of government popu-
lation to the total population. These perceived ratios are arrived at
through a uniformally distributed intelligence proportionality coefficient
for each side to the actual ratio. These intelligence coefficients reflect
the possible percentage error by either side in estimating the ratio of
government population to the total population. The range of this coef-
ficient for the insurgent group is -1.1 to -0.1 and for the government side
the range is -0.2 to 0.2, giving the advantage of better intelligence to
the insurgents. This seems to be a reasonable approach since the insur-
gents have the initiative in recruiting from the population and are generally
better organized at the local level than the government.
Both of the indicated propaganda effort functions in Figures 1 and 2
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be for each side based on the current government share of the population.
When the government-oriented population is large relative to the total
population, the insurgent population will be relatively small and concerned
mainly with building popular support through propaganda. On the other
hand, as the government's share of the population becomes small, the in-
surgent force will probably become more oriented toward pure military
action, designed to drive the government completely from power. The
government's propaganda effort is largely undisturbed, except at the
extreme ends, by the character of the conflict. This is undoubtedly true
because the government is more able to conduct operations simultaneously
in both spheres of the conflict.
Once the decision-making process has produced values for the propa-
ganda effort for both sides, the propaganda probability coefficients must
be derived. In Chapter III, Description of the Model, it was shown that
these coefficients represent the probabilities associated with six events,
(1) neutral citizen changes allegiance to insurgents, (2) government citi-
zen changes allegiance to insurgents, (3) government citizen changes
allegiance to neutral, (4) insurgent changes allegiance to neutral, (5)
insurgent changes allegiance to government, and (6) neutral changes al-
legiance to government. The probabilities associated with each of these
six events are computed as follows
P(x changes to y this time period)
= P(govt. or ins. propaganda reaches a citizen)
. P(the citizen is x)
• P(govt. or ins. propaganda changes x to y)
3 9

The probability that a citizen is x (where x represents insurgent, govern-
ment, or neutral) is simply the ratio of x citizens to the total population.
There are two functions (Figures 3 and 4) which relate propaganda
effort to the probability of reaching a citizen, one for the government and
one for the insurgents. The two curves in Figures 3 and 4 are similar: at
low effort levels the probability of reaching a citizen is low, in certain
ranges the incremental return for an increase in effort is large, and at
higher effort levels, diminishing marginal returns are experienced. These
ideas may be intuitively appealing since one would expect that at the
lower levels of effort propaganda would either be highly specialized or
spread very thinly over the entire population. Furthermore, one might
expect that as the effort increases, more and more people are exposed to
propaganda. Finally, the diminishing marginal returns experienced re-
flects a situation in which the main portion of the population becomes
saturated with propaganda and the more elusive segments of the population
remain to be reached (e.g. , insurgents trying to reach middle-class citi-
zens of large government controlled population centers) .
The two curves for the probabilities of reaching citizens with propaganda
differ in that insurgent propaganda is portrayed as being generally more
effective in reaching the population. The insurgents have the advantages
of being close to the people and of having only one area in which to con-
centrate their effort.
The functions representing the probabilities of propaganda causing
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Figures 5 through 10. These functions, reflecting the results of govern-
ment and insurgent propaganda efforts, differ only in that the insurgents
are represented as having the advantage of greater effectiveness in winning
over the neutral population and that their own people are less prone to
becoming neutrally oriented than are the government's. These two dif-
ferences are not hard to believe when one considers, once again, that the
insurgents are closer to the population and are, therefore, able to bring
more pressure to bear on the neutral faction. Also, the government citizens
probably would be more likely to become neutrally oriented than insurgents.
One can reason that when a citizen becomes an insurgent, he makes more
of a commitment, both physically and psychologically, than he does to
the better established and more familiar government cause. Finally, that
neither side has much success in directly converting citizens of the other
side is not unrealistic since a shift of this type is probably psychologically
difficult and may be fraught with danger for the person making the shift.
In the military sector, the tone of activity is determined by the number
or troops the insurgent group has in the field. The size of the insurgent
troop force is structured to depend on the size of the insurgent population
relative to the total population, or,
INSURGENT TROOPS = (percentage) (no. of insurgents),
where "percentage" is found by entering the function described in Figure
11 with the ratio of insurgents to the total population. A curve such as the
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insurgent share of the population is small the emphasis will not be on com-
bat but on building popular support through propaganda. Therefore, only a
small portion of the total force needs to be dedicated to military tasks.
As the insurgent group grows, the emphasis begins to shift toward military
action, and the fraction of the total force employed as troops increases.
There is, however, a maximum value that this percentage can take on (in
this case, 0.7). After this point, when the total force is large, increased
logistic and administrative requirements will undoubtedly necessitate re-
duction of the portion of the force dedicated to combat duties.
The insurgent force is represented as having the capability to replace
any troops lost through combat attrition in the time period following the
loss. Government troop replacement is treated as being subject to slightly
more complex decision rules, beginning with an "indicated" troop require-
ment. The indicated troop requirement for the government is established
in any time period through the functional relationship shown in Figure 12.
There are two salient features of the function for indicated government
troop requirements. First, in the area of Figure 12 called guerrilla warfare,
the government has constant indicated strength requirement of 1000 troops.
Second, in the area of the figure labeled conventional warfare, the relation-
ship between government troop strength and perceived insurgent troop
strength is linearly increasing. The feature of the indicated government
troop strength function concerning the change in the relationship between
indicated government strength and perceived insurgent strength at a level
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strength grows, battle will begin to take on more of the charactistics of
conventional warfare. That is, when the insurgent military force is small
a high ratio of government troops to insurgent troops is desirable for the
government side. When the insurgent force becomes larger they will
probably begin to engage more freely with the government forces in large
unit operations, allowing the government force to use more sophisticated
weapons, lessening the need for numerical superiority.
The government perception of insurgent troop strength is derived in
the same manner as the government intelligence estimate of total insurgent
strength in the propaganda sector. That is, the actual insurgent troop
strength is modified by a government intelligence error coefficient. This
coefficient provides for a uniformly distributed error of - 20 percent.
The indicated government troop strength obtained from the function
shown in Figure 12 is used in several decision rules which cumulatively
determine the actual strength maintained in any time period. However, the
initial value for government troop strength is taken as the first value of
indicated strength. These decision rules will be discussed after an
analysis of the attrition portion of the military sector.
Chapter III gave the equations for government and insurgent troop
attrition as
GOVT. ATTRITION = FCI TTI
and INS. ATTRITION = FCG • TTG • IC
,
where FCI and FCG are insurgent and government fighting constants which
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take on values as shown in Figures 13 and 14. Chapter III described TTI
and TTG as the total troops involved in combat for the insurgents and the
government in any time period, and IC was shown to be a variable equal
to 1000 if the insurgent troop strength is greater than 1000 and equal to
TTI if insurgent troop strength is less than 1000. The total troops involved
in combat for both sides is simply equal to the troop strength for each side
if insurgent troop strength is below 1000. When insurgent troop strength
becomes greater than 1000, TTI and TTG are equal and derived from the
following relationship
TTI = TTG = (expected no. of engagements)
(average force size)
,
where the expected number of engagements and average force size for both
sides are obtained from the functional relationships in Figures 15 and 16,
respectively.
The functions shown in Figures 13, 14, 15, and 16 undergo a funda-
mental change at the 1000-troop level for insurgents. The two functions
for the fighting constants are fixed at . 1 and 0.0001 for the insurgents
and the government respectively until an insurgent troop level of 1000 is
achieved. The functions for expected number of engagements and average
force size are also constant up to the 1000 insurgent troop level. These
changes reflect the movement away from guerrilla warfare toward more
conventional warfare. The expected number of engagements increases from
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When less than 1000 insurgent troops are present, the force size for
both sides is automatically set at their total troop strength. This procedure,
coupled with the constant value of 1 . for expected encounters, has the
effect of entering the entire troop strength of each side into the attrition
equations when the insurgent army strength is below 1000 troops. We
shall see in Chapter VI, that this procedure is justified in view of the
fairly realistic results obtained from the simulation in the area of guerrilla
warfare attrition rates.
The fixed fighting constants for both sides during the guerrilla warfare
phase imply that the state of warfare is somewhat static. Neither side is
able to improve its position relative to the other in terms of weaponry
because of the skirmish-like characteristics of battle in guerrilla warfare.
Once warfare moves into the conventional stage, both sides improve their
weapons efficiency linearly with time. The government force is allowed to
do this more rapidly because it presumably has more resources available
for this purpose. Moreover, the constant, IC , in the insurgent attrition
equation remains fixed at 1000 after the shift to conventional warfare.
This has the effect of maintaining the government's fighting constant on the
same order of magnitude as the insurgent's. These changes accomplish
the shift in Lanchester's equations discussed in Chapter III, from insur-
gents using aimed fire and government forces using area fire in the guerrilla
warfare stage to aimed fire for both sides in the conventional warfare stage.
With comabt attrition occurring in every time period, troop replacement
is naturally a subject of interest for both sides. Chapter III outlined the
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decision rules for troop replacement. We will now examine the factors
behind those decision rules.
Earlier in this chapter it was mentioned that the insurgent force is
allowed to replace its losses, man for man, in the time period following
the one in which they were incurred. This should be a reasonable procedure
since the pool of men from which they draw replacements is present in the
area in which they operate. Additionally, the "percentage rule", which
each time period establishes the fraction of the total insurgent population
to be devoted to troops, will never allow the insurgents to exceed their
available manpower.
The government force, on the other hand, has some quite different
troop replacement problems. First, the government military force is split
between police and regular troops. The police must be recruited from the
local population, and the regular troops are replaced from sources outside
the system (that is, outside the contested area). Additionally, in the
matter of maintaining a sufficient force in the system (area) under study,
the government is of course concerned with making best use of its re-
sources (troops). For this reason, then, the government must have decision
rules not only for correcting troop shortages in the system but for removal
of troops in excess of the number desired as well.
We previously discussed the procedure for computing indicated govern-
ment troop strength through a functional relationship dependent on perceived
insurgent troop strength. In the simulation, this value is compared with
present total troop strength, police and regulars, to find shortages or
56

surpluses. The disparity for police forces is noted first. The number of
police desired is determined by a fixed (user supplied) ratio of police to
the population, 0.05 in this simulation. If a police shortage exists, the
number required is added to the force after a recruiting and training delay
of three months. Any police in excess of those required are removed only
through combat attrition. Shortages in the number of regular troops are
replaced after a delay of three time periods (months). The replacement
troops begin arriving after three time periods, but the entire replacement
requires several time periods for completion.
Removal of a surplus in the number of regular government troops is
accomplished after a delay of the same magnitude and type as that for
regular troop replacement. A rule reflecting the government's desire to
take advantage of economy of scale is used in the decision-making process
for troop withdrawal. The rule allows troop withdrawal in a time period
only if the number of surplus troops exceeds 100 men.
In this chapter, we have discussed the assumptions which are input
for the insurgency growth simulation. The next chapter will be devoted to




In this chapter, we will investigate some of the results obtainable
from the insurgency growth simulation. The hypothetical data used as in-
put for the simulation runs to be discussed here are essentially the same
as those discussed in the previous chapter. All the simulation runs were
for 60 time periods, which corresponds to 5 years in the time context of
the equations of the model. Simulation runs were conducted for a variety
of initial population profiles, which ranged from 20 percent of the total
population for the government and 1 to 5 percent for the insurgents. A
short discussion of the format of the output from a DYNAMO program will
preceed the discussion of the actual output of the simulation.
A. OUTPUT FROM THE DYNAMO COMPILER
The DYNAMO compiler provides for two forms of output: tabular and
graphical. The tabular output allows the user to print any quantity desired.
Time is automatically printed in the leftmost column. The user may specify
the quantities to be printed in each of fourteen remaining columns. The
variable name of the quantity to be tabulated is printed at the top of the
page. The scale factors used are printed under each variable name. The
DYNAMO compiler will provide automatic scaling if desired, or the user
may specify the scaling of the quantities to be printed. All variables
classified as levels or auxiliaries (intermediate results) correspond to the
instant of time indicated in the row in which they appear. Rates, such as
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population generation and attrition, on the other hand, correspond to the
interval from the current time period to the next. In other words, the
government troop attrition rate for time period i would actually correspond
to the attrition rate over the interval (i, j)
.
The graphical form of output in DYNAMO provides a time-dependent
plot of the simulation output quantities. Up to ten quantities may be
specified for each plot. The user may plot all quantities on the same scale,
specify different scales for the quantities, or let the DYNAMO complier
choose the most convenient scales for the quantities to be plotted. In any
case, the variable names appear to the right of the appropriate scales at
the top of the graph. The plotting symbols for the variables are also
indicated at the top of the graph.
B. VARIABLES AS INSURGENCY INDICATORS
There are several quantities which may be obtained as output from the
simulation which will serve as useful indicators about the progress of the
insurgency. The most obvious indicators are the population profiles at any
time. The values for the insurgent, government, and neutral populations
describe the state of the system in absolute terms. The ratios of insurgent,
government, and neutral populations to the total population also yield this
information in a more easily absorbed, relative form.
In the propaganda sector it is desirable to present the relative effective-
ness of government and insurgent propaganda. Two expressions which yield
a measure of relative propaganda effectiveness for a particular time period
are the ratios of the number of citizens changing their allegiance due to
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government propaganda to the government propaganda effort and the number
of citizens changing their allegiance due to insurgent propaganda to the
insurgent propaganda effort. The numerators of these expressions include
all changes in allegiance in a time period. For example, included in
changes of allegiance due to government propaganda are insurgent-to-neutral,
insurgent-to-government, and neutral-to-government.
There are two types of useful indicators to be found in the military
sector of the model. The first of these is a running total of the government
and insurgent troops killed in combat. The second is the computation of
an exchange ratio at the end of each time period as follows,
_ . _.. Govt, killed (i)
Exchange Ratio = —-—. ... ' .
Ins. killed (1)
Two additional indicators which might be useful in describing the
overall dynamics of the insurgency system at any time are variables which
will yield the percentage change in the government and insurgent popula-
tions over each time period. These variables take the form,
Govt. % change (i, ]) = Govt. pop. (j) - Govt pop. (i)
Govt. pop. (1)
and
Ins. % change (i, j) = Ins - P°P; (» ' lns ' f°P' (i) .
Ins. pop. (i)
These variables are useful not only in a relative sense, that is, for a
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direct comparison of government and insurgent rates of increase or decrease
in population, but in an absolute sense for studying the behavior of the
system. In other words, as the rates of increase or decrease for both
sides become small, the insurgency system is clearly slowing down to a
form of equilibrium.
The indicators just discussed along with the values of other variables
will now be used to describe the output obtained from several simulation
runs. Two forms of output will be employed. One will be essentially
military, with exchange ratios, the running totals of troops killed, the
troop levels for each time period, and variables describing the troop re-
placement process. The other form of output will involve population quan-
tities and ratios as well as the propaganda effectiveness indicators.
The most interesting output is that for which the initial population
profile is heavily neutral. Specifically, the results selected for study in
detail are from the simulation run with an initial neutral population of 79
percent (7900), an insurgent population of 1 percent (100), and a government
population of 20 percent (2000) . This particular simulation run was selected
because it gives the best description of the entire spectrum of system
activity. That is, as shown in Figure 17 both the insurgent and govern-
ment populations begin small and grow relatively slowly up to the 20th time
period. Until time period 29, the troop levels, Figure 18, are also small,
allowing the observation of government and insurgent propaganda effects,
as well as the guerrilla warfare phase, in the combat sector. After time
period 29, troop levels increase, and at time 35 the insurgents have a
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combat force in excess of 1000 troops. This allows the observation of
the next phase of combat, conventional warfare, as well as the troop re-
placement procedures of the government side.
The results for the other initial population profiles (i.e. 30% - 60%
government and 5% insurgent) are similar to those of the run which is being
examined, in that the growth patterns are essentially the same for the popu-
lations and troops. Also, the approximate ratio of insurgent population to
government population after 60 time periods is .70, for all initial popula-
tion profiles. The important difference in the output between the 1% - 20% -
79% insurgent-government-neutral population profile and all other beginning
profiles is the rate of population growth and the consequent rate of combat
forces growth. With the larger initial allocations for government and in-
surgent populations we see an immediate rapid growth in the insurgent
population and a rapid initial decrease in the government population. The
principal cause for this anomaly is that the functional relationship for the
insurgent propaganda effort depends on the ratio of government population
to the total population (Figure 1) . When this ratio is large initially, a high
initial insurgent propaganda effort is dictated. This results in large initial
gains for the insurgents.
The graphical output for the 1% - 20% - 79% initial population profile
can be seen in Figures 17 and 18, and the tabled output is contained in
Tables II through V. The growth in both populations in an absolute sense
appears to be rather small until time 19. This is somewhat misleading
since, as seen in Table III, the growth rates for the government and insurgent
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populations per time period are 2% to 5% and 2% to 3%, respectively. How-
ever, since the populations are still small until time 19, the troop levels
are low, as are the insurgent and government death rates. Obviously,
troop replacement poses no problem for the government force during this
interval.
At time 19 both the government and insurgent populations begin to grow
rapidly. This just marks the beginning of rapidly increasing propaganda
effort on both sides at about the time the government attains a 30 percent
share of the total population (Figures 1 and 2 of Chapter IV) . The insurgent
troop force also begins to grow rather rapidly after time 19, but combat
does not become a major consideration until about time 35.
At time 35, the insurgent combat force exceeds 1000 men for the first
time. This marks the shift toward more conventional warfare. There are
several characteristics of the output worthy of note after time 35. First,
the rates of change become severely dampened by combat, during this
phase of more conventional warfare. The government and insurgent popu-
lation ratios are high at time 35 and, as a consequence, the propaganda
effort on both sides is high. However, increased combat deaths on both
sides produce net decreases in both populations.
In Table IV, it can be seen that the exchange ratio, or the ratio of
government dead to insurgent dead, is almost constant at 2 for each time
period up to time 34. At time 35, this exchange ratio begins to decrease.
The decrease in the exchange ratio is explained by the increased ability
of the government force to use superior weapons, as the character of the
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conflict becomes more conventional. The changeover to conventional
warfare can be noted in the rapid linear increase of the government fighting
constant at the 1000-insurgent troop level in Figure 6, Chapter IV.
After the insurgent troop strength reaches 1000 men, according to
Figure 5 in Chapter IV, the indicated government troop strength will match,
on a one-for-one basis, the government intelligence estimate of the number
of insurgent troops. From Tables IV and V, it is apparent that the indicated
troop strength and the actual total government troop strength never match
the actual insurgent troop strength. There are two reasons for this dis-
crepancy. The first reason is that indicated government troop strength
is based on an intelligence estimate of the actual insurgent troop strength.
The error in this estimate is uniformly distributed between -20 percent and
+20 percent. The discrepancies found in Figure 18 between indicated
government troop strength and actual insurgent troop strength are found to
be within these parameters.
The second reason for these discrepancies is attributable to delays in
government troop replacement for both regulars and police as well as delays
in excess troop withdrawal in the case of regulars. These delays cause
the total actual troop strength to consistently lag indicated troop strength.
The delays for regular troops and police replacement and the delay for
regular troop withdrawal are cascaded. That is, a demand is made in time
period i, and, after i + delay time periods, the demand begins to be satis-
fied. It is completely satisfied incrementally in each of several time
periods thereafter. This is not readily apparent from looking at the output
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data in Table V. However, one can see by comparing regulars desired
with regulars added, regulars in excess of demand with regulars removed,
and police desired with police added that there is clearly a lag in system
response to demands placed upon it.
Finally, something should be said about the behavior of the system
in the latter part of a simulation run. Between time periods 36 and 39, in
the simulation run under consideration, the rates of change of the insur-
gent and government populations for each time period describe a transition
to a period of relatively little net activity in the system. While the troop
levels are still relatively high and propaganda effort is still being expended,
the system has apparently settled down to a situation in which neither side
makes appreciable gains or suffers appreciable losses in significant
lengths of time. This pheonomenon is reflected in the ratios of government
citizens to insurgents, insurgents to total population, and government






















































































































































































?ime Government Insurgent Neutral
Population Population Population
w 3691 2851 2607
k9 3674 2837 2594
50 3669 2816 2580
51 3663 2795 2568
52 3671 2765 2.y^
53 3673 2743 2543
54 3650 2744 2536
5§ 3644 2735 ^^
56 3638 2722 2510
51 3651 2690 2496
58 3675 2649 248O
59 3698 2612 2467
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46 .31 .40 -.00/+ -.003
47 .31 .40 -.00/+ -.005
48 .31 .40 -.000 -.009
49 .31 .40 -.00/+ -.00/+
50 .31 .40 -.001 -.007
51 .31 .41 -.001 -.007
52 .31 .41 .002 -.010
53 .31 .41 .000 -.008
54 .31 .41 -.006 .000
55 .31 .41 -.001 -.003
56 .31 .41 -.001 -.00/+
57 .30 .41 .003 -.011
58 .30 .42 .006 -.015
59 .30 .42 .006 -.010




Simulation R<^sults: Troop Profile
Insurgent Government Exchange
Time Troops Troops Ratio
2 1000 2.00
1 1 1000 2.00
2 2 1000 2.00
3 2 1000 2.00
4 2 1000 2.00
5 2 1000 2.00
6 2 1000 2.00
7 2 1000 2.00
8 2 1000 2.00
9 2 1000 2.00
10 2 1000 2.00
11 3 1000 2.00
12 3 1000 2.00
13 3 1000 2.00
14 3 1000 2.00
15 4 1000 2.00
16 4 1000 2.00
17 5 1000 2.00
18 5 1000 2.00
19 6 1000 2.00
20 6 1000 2.00
21 7 1000 2.00
ZZ 8 1000 2.00
23 10 999 2.00
24 13 999 2.00
25 18 999 2.00
26 26 998 2.00
Z7 39 997 2.00
28 65 995 2.00
29 119 991 2.01
30 221 986 2.02
31 381 974 2.04
32 ^Sz 949 2.0?
33 780 918 2.12
34 937 896 2.16
33 1061 889 1.81
36 1200 973 1.50
32 1273 1047 1.3838 1322 1189 1.31
39 1355 1305 1.27
40 1361 1501 1.26
41 1348 1479 1.28
42 1333 1452 1.30
43 1324 1419 1.31
44 1317 1309 1.32
45 1319 1142 1.31
46 1327 1152 1.30







49 1120 1. 34
50 1293 1201 1. 35
51 1280 1369 1. 37
5* 1268 1581 1. 38
53 1248 1546 1.41
54 1236 1399 1. 43
55 122+2 1124 1. 43
56 1236 816 11. 43
5£ 1230 839 1 .44
58 1207 989 1 .48
59 1179 1196 l. 53




Simulation Results: Troop Replacement Figures
Regulars Regulars Regulars Regulars Police Police
























28 2 1 2
29 5 1 6 1
30 8 2 5 3
31 13 4 5 k
32 26 7 21 5
33 51 13 W? 13
34 82 26 51 30
35 103 if5 18 *+1
36 111 6if if 29
37 337 80 17
38 120 165 ° 8
39 387 150 16 ^
ifO 267 229 35 1°
41 30 9 22
42 6 16
43 225 8
Vf 255 75 11 {J
45 129 135 26 7
46 24 31 \k 16
47 1if3 29 15
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Regulars Regulars Regulars Regulars Police Police
Time Desired Added in Excess Removed Desired Added
48 340 67 7
49 15 39 20 3
50 332 105 32 11
51 340 181 21
52 164 234 10
53 346 7 5
54 514 120 7 2
55 365 251 16 4
56 25 289 9 10
57 434 41 9
58 325 172 12
&59 420 223 28
60 145 288 1 18
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The foregoing development of an insurgency growth model using the
systems approach has demonstrated that it is possible to model a system
such as an insurgency in the whole. That is, it is possible to construct
a model which not only includes the essential variables of an insurgency
situation but their interactions as well. The remainder of this chapter will
be devoted to recommendations for the expansion and refinement of the in-
surgency growth model.
Now that the basic framework has been constructed for the systems
modeling of insurgency, it is apparent that the majority of the work
necessary to produce a practicable insurgency model lies ahead. Within
the structure of this beginning model, there are several refinements which
could be made in both the propaganda and the military sectors. Refine-
ments could be approached in either of two ways. First, one could select
an existing or past insurgency and attempt to shape the model and its re-
visions to fit that insurgency, specifically. The second course would be
to keep the model general by concentrating on- attributes which insurgencies
have historically held in common and by attempting to discern universal
characteristics or trends in the behavior of those attributes and their rela-
tionship to each other. This second course has the advantage of usefulness
in application to hypothetical or incipient insurgencies.
The variable called propaganda effort in this model is an aggregation
of all the actions of a psychological nature the government or insurgent
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sides could take. Propaganda, in this model, might also be defined as
those actions by either side which are not purely military. Included in
this variable are programs such as propaganda itself, education, control
of the legal system, and civic action. One expansion of the basic insurgency
model would be to build submodels for each of these, and perhaps other,
programs. The main inputs for submodels such as propaganda, education
and civic action would be variables such as money and manpower. The
group undertaking the program (the government and the insurgents) would
have to be implicitly scored on efficiency and the output could be a proba-
bility statement about the effectiveness of the program in persuading citi-
zens to change their allegiance. Attributes such as the one for control of
the legal system might be expressed as an absolute advantage in terms of
contribution to the overall psychological effort of either side. That is,
control of the legal system could be expressed as a percentage for both
sides which might be dependent on some other variable such as physical
control of territory. This percentage variable could then be used as a co-
efficient for the other psychological programs of both sides, yielding a net
advantage in these programs to the side with majority control. Each of the
major programs should also be weighted proportionally according to their
contribution to the total psychological effort.
In the military sector of the model, the principal efforts should be aimed
at more research. For example, it is clear that the government side in an
insurgency situation will tailor the size of its combat force in a contested
area according to its perception of the size of the insurgent combat force.
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The subject for research would be to discover what general trends (if any)
for government troop allocation are to be found in historical data and to
apply those trends in the insurgency model. The same could be done for
variables such as the expected total troops involved in combat in any given
time period for various force levels on each side and the relationship
between the insurgent share of the total population and the size of its com-
bat force. Further, it is apparent that any system such as one. for combat
troop replacement and reenforcement has inherent delays attributable to
such causes as recruitment, decision-making, training, and transportation.
The topic for study in this area would be to first find the conditions which
contribute to these delays and second to find the behavior of the delays
under varying conditions. For example, as an insurgency becomes drawn
out the delay due to decision-making is likely to shorten, while that por-
tion of the total delay attributable to recruitment will likely become longer.
Two other areas for expansion in the insurgency model bridge the mili-
tary and psychological sectors. These are the areas of taxation and troop
recruitment. Generally speaking, it is unlikely that the insurgent force
will recruit its combat troops directly from the population. Rather, the in-
surgents will, in all likelihood, form their combat force from the hard-core
of its existing complement. On the other hand, the full-time insurgent
group depends almost entirely on the local population for its livelihood.
As the group becomes more combat-oriented, the need for a larger full-time
organization becomes greater. Hence, as the insurgency grows, the in-
surgent group becomes more and more dependent on taxation of the local
population for survival. Q

The government group has some advantage in the area of taxation in
that it does not have to tax exclusively in the area (or areas) in which the
insurgents are located. The government may even tax those areas of the
country under firm control more heavily, thereby relieving the contested
areas. On the other hand, the government must recruit combat troops
directly from the population.
Ultimately, the effect of taxation of money and food and/or the recruit-
ment of manpower away from the population is to reduce the civilian standard
of living. Historically, contested areas in insurgency situations have been
ones of a low standard of living. Undoubtedly there exists a point at
which one or both sides begin to pay a penalty for taxation and recruitment
in their psychological efforts. If an analyst were able to gain some in-
sight into what constitutes a perceptible change in the standard of living
in terms of money, food and manpower removel from a given beginning
standard, he could include this factor as a negative influence on both
sides' propaganda efforts. Experiments could then be conducted using
various government recruitment and taxation policies. For example, one
might attempt to determine the net effect on the system of a governmental
policy of removing enough food from the contested area population to
reduce them to subsistance living, thereby denying supplies to the insur-
gents. It is not clear what the benefits and dangers of such a policy are.
If carefully researched and constructed, this taxation and recruitment sub-
model could be a most rewarding addition to the insurgency growth model.
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This insurgency model and the accompanying computer simulation were
developed to provide a basis from which others could, through additional
research, formulate an analytical tool for use by government planners and
analysts in the course of dealing with the seemingly ever-present problem
of insurgency. It is hoped that the suggestions for further research con-
tained in this chapter will encourage a continuation of the effort to produce




The following computer program was written in DYNAMO II for the
IBM 360-67 computer. The program was employed as an insurgency growth
simulation in this study.
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* INSURGENCY GROWTH MODEL
NOTE
NOTE BEGIN POPULATION EQUATIONS
NOTE
N PT=1000 TOTAL POPULATION
N INS=INSC HJSURGENT POPULATION
N GC = GCC GOVERNflENT POPULATION
C INSC=100
C GCC=3000
N PIPRE^PIT INS. PROPAGANDA LAST !)T
N PGPRE=PGT GOVT. PROPAGANDA LAST DT








L INS.K=INS.J+DT*(IGR.JK-IAR.JK) INS. POP. LEVEL
R IGR.KL = PMNI ,K*NC.K*NCSAF.»C+Pfir| ,f(*GC.K INS. POP. GEM. RTF..
R IAR.ia=(PniN.K+PrilG.!0*INS.K+DI . K INS. POP. ATTRITION PATE
L GC.K=GC.J+DT*(GGR.JK-OAR.JK) GOVT. PO n . LEVEL
R GGR.KL=PMNG.K*NC.K*NCSAF.K+PMIG.K*INS.K GOVT. POP. GEM.
R GAR.KL=(Pf1GN.K+PMOI
. K)*GC. K+POLF. K*PO. K GOVT. P" n . ATT P.
L NC.K=NC.J+DT*(NCGR.JK-NCAR.Ji'J NEUTRAL POPULATION LEVEL
P NCGR.KL=PniN.K*INS.K+PnGN.K*rC.K NEUTRAL POP. GENERATION
R NCAR.KL = P'1Nl . K*NC. K+PMNG. K*NC. K NEUTRAL POl\ ATTRITION
A NCSAF.K=FIFGE(ONE / ZERO / NC.K / ZERO) DUMMY
NOTE
NOTE BEGIN PROPAGANDA EQUATIONS
NOTE
A I Wl N. K= ( PMN I . K*MC . K+Pf1G I . K*GC. K+ P ION . K*GC . IO/PI . K
C ZERO=0
C ONE=l
C ALPHA I =. 1 CONSTANT FOR EXP. SMOOTHING/ INS.
N MALPHAI=ONE-ALPHAI
C ALPHAG=.l 00M3TAMT FOR EXP. SMOOTHING/ GOVT.
N MALPHAG=UNE-ALPHAG
NOTE BEGIN IMS. PROPAGANDA EQUATIONS
NOTE
L PI PRE. K = PI . J INS. POP. PREV. DT
A PI . K=ALPHAI*PIT.K+MALPHAI*PIPRE.K INS. PROPAGANDA
A PIT.K*TABLE(TPIT/GCRI .K,0,l,.l) IMS. PROP.
T TPIT-0,.1,.5,1.5,6,8.8,10,9,5.5,2.5,0 TABLE FOR INS. PROP.
A GCRI .K=IMt .K*(GC.K/PT.K)+GC.K/PT.K IMS. EST. OF GOVT. POP.
A mi .K=NOISE()/5 IMS. INTELLIGENCE MULTIPLIER
NOTE
NOTE PROBABILITY MULTIPLIERS FROM IMS. PROPAGANDA
NOTE
A PMNI ,K=PRI .K*NCR.K*PFNI ,K PROB. NEUTRAL-TO- INS.
A PRI.K*TABLE(TPRI/PI .K/0/10/1) PROS. IMS. PROP. REACHES
T TPRI*0,.02/.05/.00/.17/.U/.58/.7/.75/.79/.3 TABLE FOR PRI
A NCR.K«NC.K/PT.K NEUTRAL-TO-TOTAL POP. RATIO
A PFNI ,K=TABLE(TPFNI/PI .K/0,10/1) PROP. IMPS. PROP. FAV. PC
T TPFNI^O/. 12/. 22/. 3/. 38/. Ul/. 45/. 1*8/. U9/. U9/. 5 TABLE PFNI
fJOTE
A PMG1.K*PRI
. K*GCR.K*PFCI .K nROB. GOVT. -TO- I MS.
A GCR.K=GC.K/PT.K GOVT . -TO-TOTAL POP. RATIO
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A PFGLK=TA3LE(TPFGI,PI .K, 0,10, 2) PROR. GC GOES INS.
T TPFGI=0,.05,.1,.1G, .18, .19 TABLE FOR PFOI
NOTE
A PMGN.K=PRI ,K*GCR.K*PFGN.K PROR. GOVT. -TO-NEUTRAL
A PFGN.K=TABLE(TPFGN, PI . K, 0,10,2) PROR. GC GOES NEUTRAL
T TPFGN=0,.1,.2,. 23,.3U,.35 TARLE FOR PFGN
NOTE
NOTE REG IN GOVT. PROPAGANDA EQUATIONS
NOTE
A GW1N. K»(PMIN. K*l NS. K+PHIG. K* I NS. K+PMNG. K*NC. K)/PG.
K
L PGPRE.K=PG.O PREVIOUS GOVT. °'>.PP .
A PG.K=ALPHAG*PGT.K+MALPHAG*PGPRE.K PRESENT GOVT. PROP.
A PGT.K=TARLE(TPGT,GCRG.K,0,1,.1) GOVT. PROP. REQUIRE:)
T TPGT=0,1,3,5,9,1Q,9,5,3,1,0 TARLE FOR PGT
A GCRG.K=ir.G.K*OC.K/PT.K)+GC.K/PT.K GOVT, EST. OF RATIO
A IMG.K=NOI SEO/2. 5 GOVT. INTELLIGENCE MULTIPLIER
NOTE
NOTE PROBABILITY MULTIPLIERS FROM GOVT. PROPAGANDA
NOTE
A PMIN.K=PRG.K*IR.K*PFIN.K PROS. I MS . -TO-NEUTRAL
A PRG.K=TA3LE(TPRG,PG.K,0,10,1) PROR. GOV'T. PROP. REACHES
T TPRG=0,. 02,. 05,. 09,. 13,. 26,. 6, .85, .92, .97,1 TASLE FOR PRG
A IR.K=INS.;</PT.K ACTUAL I NS . -TO-TOTAL POP. RATIO
A PFIN.K=TABLE(TPFIN,PG.K,0,10,2) PROS. IMS. GOES NEUTRAL
T TPFIN=0,.03,.0G, ,15,.23,.2G TASLE FOR PF I
N
NOTE
A PMIG.R=PRG.K*I R.K*PFIG.R PROS. I N5.-T0-G0VT.
A PFIG.K=TAULE(TPFIG,PG.K,0,10,2) PROR. INS. GOES GOVT.
T TPFIG*0,.08,.12,.16,.13,.10 TASLE FOP, PFIG
MOTE
A Pn M G.K-PRG.rs*NCR.!<*PF":G.K PROS. NEUTRAL-TO-GOVT.
A PFNG.K=TABLE(TPFNG,PG.K,0,10,2) PROS. NEUTRAL GOES GOVT.











N Tl *PINS* INS INITIAL INS. TROOPS
N TGP=PER*PT INITIAL GOVT. POLICE
N TGR=TG-TGP INITIAL GOVT. REGULARS
N TG=TMC
A KILLR.K = L)G.K/UI ,K
L GDEAD.K=Gl)EAD.J+TGPAR.JK+TGRAR.JK TOTAL GOVT. TROO D S DEAD
L IDEAD.K=IDEAD.J+TIAR.JK TOTAL INS. TROOPS DEAS
L TG.K=TG.J+DT*(TGGR.JK-TGAR.JK) GOVT. TROOPS LEVEL
R TGGR.KL=TGADD.K GOVT. TROOP GENERATION RATE
R TGAR.iCL=TGSUS.R+DS.!< GOVT. TROOP ATTRITION RATE
L TGP.K=TGP.J+DT*(TGPGR.JK-TGPAR.JK) GOVT. POLICE LEVEL
R TGPGR.RL=TGPARD.K POLICE GENERATION RATE
R TGPAR.KL = POLF.K*L)O.K POLICE ATTRITION RATE
L TGR.K*TGR.J+DT*(TGRGR.JK-TGRAR.JK) GOVT. REGULAR TROOPS
R TGRGR.KL-TGRADD.K REGULAR GENERATION RATE
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R TGRAR.KL«TGRSUB.K+REGF.K*DO.K " rn 'J! <\R ATTRITION RATE
L TI.K*TI .J+DT*(TIGR.JK-TIAR.JK) INS. TROnr LEVEL
R TIGR.KL=PINS.K*INS.K-TI.K INS. TROOP GENERATION RATE
R TIAR.KL=DI.K INS. TROOP ATTRITION RATE
L PT.K=PT.J-DT*(TIAR.JK+TGPAR.JK) TOTAL POP. LEVEL
NOTE
NOTE
A REGF.K=TGR.K/TGTOT.K REGULAR-TO-TOTAL GOVT. TROOPS RATIO
A POLF.K=ONE-REGF.K POLICE-TO-TOTAL GOVT. TROOPS RATIO
A INSR.K=INS.K/PT.K I N3. -TO-TOTAL POP. RATIO
A PINS.K=TARLE(TPINS, IMSR.K,0,l,.l) PERCENT OF INS.
T TPINS=0 / .15 / .33 / .U5 / .53 / .7 / .G7,.G / .»f5 / .U / .U TABLE PINS
A TIEST.K=TI.K+IMC.K*TI.K GOVT. EST. OF INS. TROOPS
A TMG.K = TA3LE(TTiiC,TI EST.!K, 0,5000,1000) GOVT. TROOPS PEO.
T TTMG=1000, 1000, 2000, 3000,^000,5000 TABLE FOR TMG
A TGDIF.K=TMG.K-TG.K PRESENT GOVT. TROOP REQUIREMENT
A TGDIFP.K=-TGDI F.K
A TGADD.K=FI FGECTGD IF. K, ZERO, TGDI F.K, ZERO) GOVT.' ADD
A TGSUB.K=FIFGE(ZERO,TGDIFP.K,TGDlF.K,ZERO) GOVT. REMO.
A FCI .K=TA3LE(TFCI,TI .K,0, 5000,1000) FIGHTING CONSTANT INS
T TFCI=.l, .1,.125, .15, .175, .2 TABLE FOR FCI
A FCG.K=TA3LE(TFCG,TI .R,0, 5000,1000) FIGHTING CONSTANT GO'/
T TFCG=. 00005, .00005, .00015, .0002, .0002, .0002 TABLE FOR FCG
A EENC.K=TABLE(TEENC / TI . K, 0,5000, 1000) EXP. NO. ENG.
T TEENC=1,1,15,25,30,30 TABLE FOP EENC
A AFSG.K=FIFGE(FST.K / TG.K / TI .K/TNOU) AVERAGE FORCE GOVT.
A AFS1 ,K=FIFGE(FST.K,TI .K,Tl ,K,THOU) AVERAGE FORCE INS.
A FST.K=TABLE(TFST,TI .K,0, 5000,1000) rORCE SIZE
T TFST=0,50 / 100,200,500,500 TABLE FOP FST
A TTG.K=EENC.K*AFSG.K TOTAL GOVT. TROO DS INVOLVED
A TT! .K=EENC.K*AF5I .K TOTAL IMS. TROOPS INVOLVED
A IC.K = FI FGE(T!!0O,TTI .K,TI .K,T! J PU) CONSTANT FOR COMBAT EON.
A DG.R=FCI . K*TTI . K GOVT. TROOPS KILLED
A 01 .K=FCG.K*TTG.K*IC.K INS. TROOPS KILLED
L TGPTEP.K = TGPTE.l. J
A TGPACT . K=F I FGE (TGPTEfl. K, TG PTE P . K, TG PTF.J I . K, TG PTE P . K
)
A TGPDE3. K=MULT*(TGPACT. K-TGPTEP. R)
A TGPTEM. K=F I FGE(TGPGir."v/ ZERO, TGPR I F.K, ZERO) POLICE DPS.
A TGPDIF.K=PER*PT.K-TGP.K POLICE REQUIRED
A TGPADD.K=DELAY1(TGPDES.K,DEL) DELAY FOR ADDITION OF POL.
A TGRD I F . K=TMG. K-TGP. K-TCR. R REGULARS REQU I RED
A TGRDES. K=F I FGE (TGRD I F . R, ZERO, TGRD I F . K, ZERO) REGULARS DES.
A LOTS. K=FIFGE(ZERO,A3SDIF.K,TGRHIF.K, ZERO) REGULARS EXC.
A ABSDIF.K=-TGRDIF.K
A REML.K=FIFCE(LOT3.K, ZERO, LOTS. K,HUN) REMOVE ANY?
A TGRSUBT.K=DELAY1(RERL.K,DELP) DELAY FOR REGULAR REMOVAL
A TGRARDT.K = DELAY1(TGRPF.S.R,RELP) DELAY FOR REGULARS APDEP
A TGRADD.K=FI FGE (TGRARDT . K, ZERO, TGRD I F . K, ZERO )
A TGRSU3.K = FI FCE(ZERO,TGR5UBT. K,TGRDI F. K, ZERO)
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